We analyze the relationship between contracts and returns in private equity (PE) investments. Contractual control in the form of covenants tends to be employed to identify good deals. Better quality …rms are more likely to have covenant-rich contracts, as they are less concerned by the constraints imposed by the covenants. PE investors appoint closer associates of the fund in deals that are performing poorly but tend to outsource board governance in better deals. Collectively, our evidence suggests that PE investors operate along two dimensions, choosing covenants and board seats di¤erently, based on the ex-ante quality of the company.
Introduction
In recent years, the uniqueness and complexity of private equity (PE) contracts has attracted much interest among academics and the wider public. From a practical perspective, this has been the result of the increasing importance of PE in the economy. From a conceptual perspective, PE contracts have o¤ered academics a primary exploratory …eld for developing and testing theories of optimal contracting. An extensive theoretical literature has developed on how to optimally design the investments of PE investors in venture capital …nanced …rms. 1 From the empirical viewpoint, however, there is still relatively little evidence on the relationship between contract design and investment returns. 2 In this paper, we begin to …ll this gap in the literature by examining how contracts and returns are related in PE investments. There are many dimensions along which PE investors structure the terms of an investment in a PE-…nanced …rm. These include, among others, the choice of securities, voting and cash ‡ow rights, liquidation options, and the appointment of directors in the board of the target …rm. In most cases, the de…nition of these terms is expressed in speci…c covenants that PE investors include in the contract at the time of entry.
The covenants used by PE investors are rather di¤erent from those attached to bank loans (Drucker and Puri, 2009) or credit lines (Su…, 2009 ) which primarily focus on the maintenance of certain …nancial ratios, such as cash ‡ows over assets or interest coverage.
In contrast, covenants in a PE context e¤ectively de…ne the securities held by PE investors, as they identify the contingencies in which certain actions can be taken by the involved 1 parties. By focusing on covenants we are then able to o¤er new insights on the structure of PE contracts and their relation to returns.
We base our work on a proprietary database of 834 deals provided by a currently active Italian management company. The database covers all deals that occurred between January 1999 and December 2005 in which the target company is incorporated in Italy and the investment company is registered as an Italian PE management company. Although our sample is restricted to Italian deals, it is informative of the PE market in continental Europe due to the common regulatory framework shared by the members of the European Union. The majority of our deals belong to the categories of expansion …nancing (50.7%) and buyouts (27.1%), while venture capital …nancing, in the form of early stage, represents only a minority of observations (16.7%). Exit from investment primarily occurs via trade sale (86.9%), while IPOs and write-o¤s are relatively rare (respectively 5.1% and 6.5%).
We begin our analysis by observing that covenant-heavy contracts are generally associated with higher returns, regardless of whether the measure of returns employed is the IRR of the fund, the change in ROE and ROA, or the increase in sales over the investment period. The relationship seems to be driven by lockups, permitted-transfer rights, exit ratchets, and, to a lesser extent, rights of …rst refusal and redemption rights.
We then examine self-selection in the choice of covenants. Li and Prabhala (2007) review several methods of self-selection. We focus on the model of Lee (1978) , subsequently implemented by Goyal (2005) in a …nance context. 3 In this model the selection decision depends on the expected treatment e¤ects that the inclusion of covenants has on returns.
For completeness, we also estimate a standard switching model. From the results obtained in the estimation of the two models, we …nd that there is a selection e¤ect associated with the inclusion of covenants, and that covenant heavy …rms are generally better performers.
These …ndings are consistent with two explanations. First, it may be that …rms with higher expected performance have lower bargaining power vis-a-vis PE investors and are required to accept more covenants. Alternatively, …rms with better prospects are willing to take up more covenants because they are less likely to be constrained by them.
Therefore, the presence of covenants acts as a signal of high quality. The …rst of these two explanations does not seem very plausible, as …rms with better prospects should have stronger rather then weaker bargaining power when dealing with a PE investor. The second explanation appears relatively more plausible and particularly well suited to covenants that o¤er protection to PE investors if performance is lower than expected. These covenants include redemption rights and permitted transfers, and are unlikely to bind for a successful …rm. The estimated treatment e¤ects are stronger for covenants that provide incentives to managers for pro…t maximization, such as deals with lockup, rights of refusal, or an exit ratchet.
Next, we examine the choice of directors appointed in the board of target …rms, which we regard as an alternative contracting dimension through which PE investors control the behavior of the …rms they invest in. We classify appointed directors as either outsiders or insiders. We employ four di¤erent measures for this classi…cation. We look at whether the appointed director is or has been an employee of the PE fund, presently has strong ties with the fund, had strong ties with the fund in the past, and whether there is a match in the maturity of the appointment and the duration of the fund. We borrow from Lerner (1995) the hypothesis that insiders are appointed when the need for oversight is greater, which suggests a negative relationship between investment performance and the strength of the ties between appointed director and fund. Our …ndings show a negative association between the appointment of insiders and target …rm pro…tability, which suggests that insiders are appointed in …rms with lower prospects, thus providing support to Lerner's hypothesis.
Overall, our …ndings contribute to the understanding of how PE investors design contracts in the presence of hidden information and moral hazard. They operate along two dimensions choosing covenants and board seat di¤erently, based on the ex-ante quality of the company. Contractual control in the form of covenants is primarily employed to identify good deals. Firms signal their quality by accepting more or less covenant-heavy contracts, as better …rms are less concerned by the constraints imposed by the covenants. At the same time, however, covenants can also change performance, possibly by strengthening the incentives of …rm managers towards pro…t maximization. In addition to covenants, PE investors employ direct board control to strengthen control in worse deals. They do so by appointing closer associates of the fund in deals that are performing poorly and outsourcing board governance in better deals.
To our knowledge this is the …rst paper that addresses empirically the relationship between contracts and returns in PE investments. It establishes a link between the strand of literature on the returns of PE investments (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 1997; Groh and Gottschalg, 2006; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Lerner et al., 2007; Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003) and that on venture capital contracts (Bengtsson, 2010; Gompers, 1999; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection process and provides descriptive statistics for our sample. Section 3 provides a discussion of the information content of covenants. Sections 4 and 5 examine the relation between covenants and returns using selection models. Section 6 analyzes the choice of board directors. Finally, Section 7 concludes. Importantly, due to privacy restrictions, MPS Venture SGR has not disclosed the names of any of the entities involved. Therefore, 1) we are unable to merge our data back into publicly available databases such as Amadeus/AIDA to complement the balance sheet information that may still be missing; 2) we cannot distinguish between …rst, second or higher rounds of …nancing to the same …rm by di¤erent PE investors; and 3) we do not know which …rms are public or private at the time of investment. Nevertheless, in our sample, the standard investment strategy for PE funds is "one …rm, one investment", meaning that neither stage …nancing nor syndication are employed.
Finally, we complement the database of MPS Venture with aggregate macroeconomic data at the time of investment, obtained from Datastream and AIDA/Amadeus: 1) the returns of the Italian stock index, 2) the ratio of IPOs over newly created …rms, 3) industry leverage, and 4) industry ROE.
Sample Characteristics
The sample includes 834 investments made by 104 PE funds owned by 73 management companies. Most target …rms operate in the consumer goods sector (34%), the general industrial sector (25%), and the services sector (20%). Consistent with the structure of the Within this subsample the controlling bank has a credit relationship with the target …rm in 80.38% of cases. Importantly, the existence of a credit relationship is evaluated at the time of investment and is not related to debt issued in conjunction with a leveraged buyout, a type of deal that is very rare in our sample. These data on credit relationships suggest that equity …nancing by a PE fund in conjunction with debt …nancing by the controlling bank is a common phenomenon in Italian deals. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our returns measures, which include yearly IRR, and the yearly changes in sales, ROA, and ROE over the investment period. IRR is simply computed as the di¤erence in PE investors'equity stake at the time of investment and exit. Annualizations are based on yearly compounding. 5 These measures respectively proxy for the returns to the PE investors (IRR), to all stakeholders in the …rm (sales, ROA) and to equityholders (ROE). The averages (medians) of yearly IRR, growth in sales, ROA and ROE are 9.4% (10.61%), 6.68% (3.92%), 6.01% (3.19%), and 17.59% (7.23%).
The estimated median IRR for the 11 unexited deals is -4.32%. As comparison Kaplan and Schoar (2005) …nd that equal-weighted median and average IRRs reported by Venture Economics over the period 1980 are 12% and 17%, respectively. Cochrane (2005 …nds that venture capital investments generate average log returns of 15% per year. Bygrave and Timmons (1992) …nd an average IRR of 13.5% for the period 1974 -1989 . Gompers and Lerner (1997 report an arithmetic average yearly IRR of 30.5% gross of fees over the years 1972 -1997 . Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003 produce an estimated IRR of 19.8%.
Finally, we observe that buyouts and early-stage are respectively the most and the least pro…table type of investments, irrespective of the measure employed. Kaplan and Schoar also …nd that returns to buyout funds are slightly higher than the returns to venture funds.
In our sample, IPOs are the most pro…table type of exit. 
Covenants
In our sample we observe seven di¤erent covenants: lockups, permitted-transfer rights, redemption rights, tag-along rights, drag-along rights, rights of …rst-refusal, and exit ratchets.
A de…nition of these covenants is provided in Table 2 . We …nd that in our sample there is more variety in the choice of covenants than in previous studies. Cumming (2008) reports four covenants: right to replace the CEO, redemption rights, drag-along rights, and antidilution rights. Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) report the use of redemption rights, anti-dilution provisions, and automatic-conversion provisions. In both papers PE investors employ a mix of securities which includes various types of preferred stock and convertible debt, while in our sample PE investors always hold common equity. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our set of covenants. Tag-along rights are the most common type of covenant (86.93% of the deals), followed by drag-along rights, permitted transfer and redemption rights. There is relatively little variation in the use of covenants across di¤erent investment types, but there is large variation across di¤erent types of exit. Lockups, permitted transfers, redemption rights, rights of …rst-refusal and 8 exit ratchets are more likely to be included when exit occurs via an IPO. In untabulated results we …nd that over time there has been a tendency towards "covenant-lite"contracts, with a marked reduction in the use of tag-along, drag-along and redemption rights.
Table 3 About Here
We …nd a positive correlation in the use of lockups, permitted transfers, redemption rights and rights of …rst-refusal. This suggests that certain types of covenants might be bundled together to form a contracting style. To explore this point in more detail and identify di¤erent contracting styles, we perform a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). 6 As in Principal Component Analysis, the MCA o¤ers a low-dimensional representation of the data, in a way that best preserves the original variance of the data. The …rst dimension of variation explains 84.2% of covenant variability. This component is strongly related to lockups and rights of …rst-refusal, and to a smaller extent also to permitted transfers, redemption rights, and exit ratchets. The second component explains only 0.03% of the total data variability and is strongly related tag-along rights and to drag-along rights.
We observe three relatively well de…ned clusters, plus a singleton. Lockups and rights of …rst-refusal represent the …rst cluster. The second cluster is composed by tag-along and drag-along rights. We label this cluster default covenants because tag-and drag-along rights are present in the majority of deals. Redemption rights and permitted-transfer rights form the third cluster. Since both give PE investors an exit option, we refer to this cluster as protection covenants. Exit ratchets represent a singleton which cannot be perfectly mapped into any of the previous clusters. Given that exit ratchets are instrumental in providing incentives to managers, we group them together with lockups and rights of …rst refusal to form the third group of covenants to which we refer as incentive covenants. In Table 3 we report statistics for the three clusters.
The Information Content of Contracts
The existing theories on the role of contracts in the …nancing of an entrepreneurial …rm identify adverse-selection and double-sided moral hazard as the two main sources of information problems in venture capital contracts. 7 We examine from a theoretical standpoint the interplay between covenants, information problems and returns.
We start by looking at incentive covenants. These covenants provide incentives to managers for maximizing …rm value, and also appear to be associated with high quality …rms. Aghion et al. (2004) , Brav and Gompers (2003) , Casares-Field and Hanka (2001) , and in a broader setting Holmström (1979) , suggest that lockups help align the incentives of managers and PE investors with the maximization of equity value. Also, lockups signal …rm quality because they are generally associated with IPOs (see Table 3 ) which is the most pro…table type of exit. Rights of …rst-refusal (a.k.a as preemption rights) and exit ratchets are also meant to preserve the incentives of managers towards value maximization, respectively by preventing a dilution of the managers'interest in the …rm, and by rewarding managers with new shares in case of high returns. 8 Overall, we should expect incentive covenants to be positively correlated with returns because they signal high …rm quality and strengthen incentives.
With respect to protection covenants, permitted-transfer rights give PE investors the option to sell their stake in the …rm without requesting the permission of other shareholders (Yates and Hinchli¤e, 2010) , while redemption rights allow PE investors to sell their shares back to the company (long put), typically in the event an IPO or a public merger becomes unlikely. Both types of covenants signal strong bargaining power of PE investors, but also indicate uncertainty about the …rm's future prospects.
Finally, the two default covenants, tag-and drag-along rights, maximize the likelihood of a pro…table exit and should then correlate positively with returns. Empirically it is di¢ cult to estimate their relationship with returns, precisely because the vast majority of …rms in the sample includes one of these covenants, thus reducing the power of the statistical tests.
Similar but weaker results hold for yearly change in sales as reported in Panel B. In both panels we also include our three contracting styles. Incentive covenants is a dummy for the inclusion of either a lockup, right of …rst refusal or exit ratchet. Protection covenants is a dummy for presence of either a permitted transfer or a redemption right. Default covenants is a dummy for presence of either tag-or drag-along rights. We …nd that only incentive covenants yield a high and signi…cant di¤erence. 
Multivariate Evidence
We next explore the relationship between covenants and returns in a multivariate setting controlling for …rm and deal characteristics, and monitoring. We consider the following …rm characteristics: pro…tability, size, leverage, and industry (nine dummies for the sector in which the target …rm operates). The investment characteristics include: the percentage of shares acquired, investment type (dummies for early, expansion, buyout and turnaround), vintage (dummies for the year of the investment), investment duration (length of the investment expressed in months), bank relationships (a dummy that takes value of one if the fund is majority owned by a bank and there is a lending relationship between bank and target …rm). We include a dummy for un-exited deals. We also control for the cumulative number of board seats simultaneously held by the director appointed by the fund. As we discuss in more detail in Section 6 below, a higher number of board seats proxies for a closer relationship between the director and the fund. These variables are de…ned and summarized in Table 5 .
Table 5 About Here
We run a set of 66 regressions, one for each return measure (plus IPO and Write-o¤) on each covenant (plus the covenant index and the three contracting styles), controlling for the above …rm and deal characteristics and for board seats. We use OLS to estimate all equations involving a continuous measure of returns, and probit models to estimate the probability of exit. We cluster the standard errors at the PE investor level. 9 The results of all the regressions performed above are summarized in Table 6 . Panel The main …ndings of Table 6 are: 1) the relationship between the covenant index and returns is strong and positive also in a multivariate setting; 2) this relationship appears to be driven mainly by lockups, permitted transfers, and exit ratchets, and to a lesser extent by rights of …rst refusal and redemption rights; 3) tag-and drag-along appear generally uncorrelated to returns, thus con…rming their status of default covenants. 
Selection Models
The empirical …ndings of the previous section raise non-trivial theoretical and empirical issues. From a theoretical standpoint, in a model of optimum contracting in which covenants 9 In untabulated results we carry out a robustness check by including PE …xed e¤ects (a dummy for each management company) in the regressions. Results on covenants are una¤ected.
are chosen to maximize returns, a reduced form equation of returns should depend solely on the parameters of the model. The same should hold for covenants. 10 If we take this line of reasoning literally, then empirically we should not expect to observe a relationship between covenants and returns. However, in practice such relationship may arise because covenants can proxy for omitted variables. As suggested by Li and Prabhala (2007) , we may regard this as a problem of self-selection in which covenants capture some of the information privately held by the contracting parties. The selection of covenants gives us information about some unobserved heterogeneity in …rm quality.
Self-selection, however, may not be the only reason why covenants are interesting from an empirical point of view. For instance, covenants can also change manager behavior by improving incentives to maximize …rm value. This would imply a positive relationship between covenants and returns, which could also partially explain the empirical facts observed in Table 6 . We employ the methods suggested by Lee (1978) to estimate selection and treatment e¤ects of covenants on returns.
Estimates of Self-Selection Models
We model the decision to include covenants in the PE contract with the following equation:
Here C i represents the value of including covenants in the contract, i.e. covenants will be included if C i 0; and they will not be included otherwise. y 1i is the return of an investment with covenants, and y 0i is the return on an investment without covenants; thus, (y 1i y 0i ) is the increase in performance when covenants are included in the contract, relative to when they are not included. Z i contains other variables that may a¤ect the choice of introducing covenants, such as …rm and fund-speci…c characteristics, and market conditions at the time of the investment.
Performance is di¤erent when covenants are included than when they are not. Thus, we model these two cases separately as a function of a vector X i containing only …rm and fund characteristics:
Equation (2) is the outcome regression for investments with covenants and Equation (3) is the outcome regression for investments without covenants. This means that only one of y 1i or y 0i is observed for each individual i; depending on whether C i 0 or C i < 0: We de…ne a dummy variable I i = 1 when C i 0 and I i = 0 when C i < 0: As Li and Prabhala (2007) point out, the above set-up is a generalization of the standard switching model discussed in Maddala (1983) . The standard model also considers two regimes, as in Equations 2 and 3. The di¤erence is that the decision to include covenants is given by the criterion function
which does not depend on y 1i or y 0i :
The procedure developed by Lee (1978) to estimate the system of equations (5), (2) and (3) consists of substituting the outcome Equations (2) and (3) into the selection Equation (1). This allows us to obtain a reduced-form model in which covenants are solely a function of …rm-deal characteristics and market conditions:
As a second step, Equation (5) The selection-adjustment estimation procedure sketched here is useful for the following reasons: 1) by adjusting for self-selection we obtain consistent estimates for 1 and 0 ;
2) the statistical signi…cance of the coe¢ cient for the inverse Mills ratio captures possible self-selection e¤ects associated with the inclusion of covenants; and 3) the statistical signi…cance of parameter captures possible treatment e¤ects associated with the inclusion of covenants. The omitted variables used to correct for self-selection, 1i and 0i ; can be interpreted as an estimate of the private information underlying a …rm's choice (Li and Prabhala, 2007) .
It is worth noting that in a standard switching model, a positive sign for the coe¢ cient of the inverse Mills ratio means that covenants act as a signal of high returns, and it implies a positive covariance between the unexplained factors that a¤ect returns and those that a¤ect the choice of covenants. In the Lee (1978) model, however, the signs of the coe¢ cients for the inverse Mills ratios do not have a direct interpretation, because the coe¢ cients estimate the covariance between u 1i and u i (or u 0i and u i ); which depends on the second moments of the error terms u 1 ; u 0 and u, as discussed in detail in Lee (1978) : For this reason, in the analysis below we will estimate both the Lee (1978) We acknowledge that it is di¢ cult to identify instruments that correlate with covenants but not with performance, and thus do not violate the exclusion condition. In particular, it may be that pre-deal market conditions a¤ect IRR directly and not only via the choice of covenants. For example, consider the following mechanism suggested by Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2000) : as entry prices are in ‡uenced by market conditions, with prices being higher in heated markets than in low markets, IRR is a function of the share price at the time of contracting and at the time of exit. If this reasoning was correct, market conditions would not satisfy the exclusion condition when performance is measured with IRR. To avoid this problem, we employ other measures of performance (sales, ROA and ROE) alongside with IRR. These other measures appear less exposed to a violation of the exclusion condition because they do not depend on the entry price paid by the fund.
We construct a new dummy, covenant heavy, which takes value one if the covenant index is greater than its median value across the sample. The covenant heavy dummy and the three contracting styles identi…ed above (incentives, default, protection) respectively represent the dependent variables in the criterion function of Equation (1).
Table 7 About Here
We follow the estimation procedure sketched above. We start by estimating the reducedform model in Equation (5). We then obtain the inverse Mills ratios and use it to augment Equations (2) and (3), the estimates of which are reported in Table 7 . The dependent variable changes across columns: it is IRR in columns 1a and 1b, change in sales in columns 2a and 2b, change in ROA in columns 3a and 3b, and change in ROE in Columns 4a and 4b. The coe¢ cients in columns 1a, 2a, 3a and 4a are for Equation (3) (I i = 0), while in columns 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b they are for Equation (2) The inverse Mills ratio is 1) always signi…cant when covenant heavy is the selection variable, 2) generally signi…cant for incentive and protection covenants (relatively more so for the latter), 3) almost always not signi…cant for default covenants. These results suggest that there is a selection e¤ect associated with the use of covenants, that the e¤ect depends signi…cantly on the covenants employed, and that the e¤ect is stronger for protection and, albeit to a lesser extent, incentive covenants.
We next estimate the standard model outlined in Equation (4). In untabulated results
we …nd that the coe¢ cients of the inverse Mills ratios for the standard model are always positive and signi…cant for covenant heavy deals and for incentive covenants; positive and signi…cant for protection covenants, when the outcome is measured with IRR; generally, not signi…cant for default covenants. 12 Therefore, the standard switching model suggests that better …rms are associated with having more covenants and with incentive and, albeit to a lesser extent, protection covenants. 13 We also estimate counterfactuals by computing the predicted returns associated with the observations that carry covenants, using the estimated coe¢ cients for the observations that do not carry covenants. 14 Our estimations suggest that it is optimal for covenant laden …rms, and for …rms using incentive or protection covenants to make the choice of covenants that we observe in reality. For example, the estimated IRR for …rms with 1 2 We also construct three new dependent variables, given by the di¤erence between IRR and, respectively, sales growth, ROA growth and ROE growth. We run the base selection model using these di¤erences as dependent variables and covenant heavy as the selection variable. We observe a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient for the inverse Mills ratio for the …rst two measures and insigni…cant for the third one. This result suggests that covenants are associated with more than proportionally higher returns for PE investors than for other types of investors.
1 3 The results of the standard switching model can also be interepreted to indicate that one source of treatment e¤ect is because the PE investor picks up a …rm whose value is lower than it should be. However, this explanation is mainly suited to explain the e¤ect that treatment has on IRR than on the other measures of performance (sales, ROA, ROE), that do not depend on entry and exit prices. 1 4 Formally, the counterfactual for …rms with covenants had they not used covenants is de…ned as E(y1jX; I = 1; 0 ); and the counterfactual for …rms without covenants had they used covenants is E(y0jX; I = 0; 1 ): See Poon, Lee and Gup (2009) for comprehensive de…nitions of counterfactual measures in a switching model applied to solicited vs unsolicited bank ratings.
incentive covenants (I i = 1) is 20.5%, while the counterfactual estimate for these …rms is 11.1%. For protection covenants, the corresponding …gures are an estimated 10.8% vs. 4.8% had they not chosen the covenant. In contrast, …rms that chose not to include protection or incentive covenants would have performed better had they chosen to include them.
Finally, we proceed to the last step of Lee's estimation procedure, and produce estimates of Equation (1) in which y 1i and y 0i are the values predicted by (2) and (3). Table 8 reports our estimation of , which is meant to capture how expected treatment e¤ects in ‡uence the decision to include covenants. The table reports the coe¢ cient of obtained in all the possible combinations of selection variables (in columns) and outcome variables (in rows). The main …nding of this estimation is that is positive and signi…cant for the covenant heavy dummy and for incentive covenants with respect to change in sales, ROA and ROE, while it is not signi…cant for IRR. On the other hand, the coe¢ cient is never signi…cant for default and protection covenants. 
The Choice of Board Directors
As shown by Barry et al. (1990) , Lerner (1995) and Sahlman (1990) , it is common practice in the U.S. for PE investors to elect one or more directors in the board of the …rms in their portfolio. The role of these directors is to represent the interests of the PE fund by exerting direct oversight on the managers of the …rm. In our sample deals we also …nd that the appointment of directors is a common phenomenon. Almost invariably PE funds appoint only one director, regardless of the percentage of shares acquired.
We classify appointed directors as outsiders and insiders, depending on whether 20 the appointee is or has been an employee of the fund, or has strong ties with the fund.
Our de…nition of insider is di¤erent from that employed by Lerner (1995) , which classi…es directors into outsiders and insiders with respect to their relationship with the …rm, rather than with respect to the fund.
We want to investigate whether the appointment of a certain type of director is related to …rm performance. We focus on the hypothesis suggested by Lerner (1995) that "if venture capitalists are intensive monitors of managers, their involvement as directors should be more intense when the need for oversight is greater." Therefore, we expect outsiders to be appointed in …rms where less monitoring is required. These …rms are likely to be the less risky and more pro…table, which implies that we should observe a negative correlation between the appointment of insiders and returns. 15 We provide four di¤erent measures of inside directors. Our …rst measure is based on the cumulative number of appointments held by any given director on behalf of the PE investor during the time of investment. A higher number means stronger ties with the fund. Our second measure is the cumulative number of appointments held by a director before the time of investment. This measure has the same meaning of the …rst one, but is backward looking. Third, we look at whether the director is or has been an employee of the fund. Fourth, we look at whether the appointment of the director has the same duration as the board of the target …rm. A match of duration is typically observed when a director is an outsider. Table 5 provides summary statistics for each of these measures.
We now examine the relationship between the choice of directors and returns. We employ our four measures of inside directors. We …rst explore the univariate correlation between the choice of director and returns. In untabulated results, we …nd a negative relationship between the choice of an inside director and sales, ROA, and ROE, and a weak negative correlation between the choice of an inside director and an IPO. There is no signi…cant unconditional correlation between IRR and the choice of an inside director.
We then analyze whether the relationship observed between returns and the presence of an inside director is robust in a multivariate setting. To examine the coe¢ cients of the inside directors we look at the selectivity-bias adjusted regressions for all four measures of performance and all four measures of inside directors, thus obtaining sixteen coe¢ cients for Equation (2) and sixteen coe¢ cients for Equation (3). These coe¢ cients are reported in the relevant row of Table 7 for the variable board seats during and in Table 9 for the other three measures of inside directors.
Table 9 About Here
Our main …nding from the two tables is that for all four measures of insider we observe a negative relationship with performance which is stronger for sales, ROA and ROE than for IRR. The explanation provided by Lerner (1995) that internal directors are appointed where there is a need for more intensive monitoring seems to be supported by the data for all four measures of board directors. It is also consistent with the weaker correlation between these measures and IRR. The interpretation of the latter result may be that even though insiders signal low …rm prospects, the IRR of the investment is not a¤ected as much as other measures of performance.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the relationship between the returns of PE investments and contract characteristics. We identify covenants as the main object of analysis and …nd a strong positive relationship between the number of covenants included in a deal and deal returns. This relationship holds for di¤erent measures of returns (IRR, growth in sales, ROA and ROE). The relationship is robust after controlling for a number of …rm, industry and investment characteristics.
We conjecture that the observed correlation between covenants and returns is caused by a self-selection process in which PE investors choose covenants based on their expectations of the target …rm's future prospects. We use a three-stage methodology that allows us to (i) account for self-selection in the use of covenants, and (ii) for the possible treatment e¤ects that covenants have performance. Our central …nding is that self-selection plays a key role in the choice of covenants and more covenants are associated with better …rm prospects. The choice of covenants reveals unobservable private information that is not otherwise observable by looking at public information, contained, for example, in accounting variables. We interpret this evidence to indicate that …rms signal their better prospects to potential investors by accepting more covenants than average. We also show that covenants can carry treatment e¤ects that likely operate by strengthening the incentives of managers towards pro…t maximization.
Finally, we examine the relationship between the appointment of board directors and returns. We …nd that internal directors are appointed in …rms that are less pro…table. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the hypothesis of Lerner (1995) Table 2 Definitions of Covenants and Directors Lockup A provision in the underwriting agreement between some or all existing shareholders that prohibits the sale of shares before a predetermined date.
Permitted Transfer
The permission to a VC to make transfers of shares without pre-emption in favor of the remaining shareholders. The types of permitted transfers may vary according to the class of shares. There will usually be a permitted transfer provision allowing transfers between two or more separate funds managed by the same VC.
Redemption right Rights to force the company to purchase shares (a "put"). A redemption right allows one shareholder to liquidate an investment in the event an IPO or a public merger becomes unlikely. One may also negotiate a redemption provision to become effective when the company defaults or fails to make payments upon a key employee's death, etc.
Tag-along Rights A minority shareholder protection affording the right to include their shares in any sale of control and at the offered price ("right of co-sale") Drag-along Rights A majority shareholders right, obligating minority shareholders whose shares are bound into the agreement, to sell their shares into an offer the majority wishes to execute.
Right of First Refusal
A negotiated obligation of the company or existing investors to offer shares to the company or other existing investors at fair market value or a previously negotiated price, prior to selling shares to new investors ("pre-emption right").
Exit Ratchet An exit ratchet is used to adjust the respective shareholdings of the VCs and insiders depending on either the level of returns or on an exit. This clause is principally used to provide additional incentives/rewards to the managers for delivering high returns to investors. This table examines the relationship between covenants and performance in a multivariate setting. In Panel A we regress each measure of performance on the covenant index, also controlling for firm characteristics, investment type, year, and industry fixed effects. In Panel B each performance measure is regressed on each covenant individually, as well as on the three subsets incentive, protection, default, again controlling for firm and investment characteristics, and investment, year, and industry fixed effects. For each regression in Panel B we report only the coefficient on the relevant covenant. Firm characteristics include: profitability, size, leverage, industry, bank relationships and board seats (during). Investment type is: early, expansion, buyout, turnaround. We also include a dummy for un-exited deals. All regressions have 782 observations. Standard errors clustered at the management company level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. More precisely, Covenant Heavy is a dummy variable that takes value one if the number of covenants employed in a deal is above median. Incentive, Default, and Protection Covenants are dummies for inclusion of incentive, default, or protection covenants in the deal, respectively. We control for firm characteristics, investment type and outcome (exited/unexited); year and industry fixed effects. We also include four instruments all computed over the six months preceding the investment: public market returns, average industry ROE, ratio of IPOs to newly created firms, and average number of covenants in previous deals. We also report the Wald test on the significance of the instruments. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. (2)- (3), as obtained through the three-stage procedure described in Lee (1978) and Goyal (2005) . ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. (2) and (3) after correcting for the selection bias in the use of covenants. The selection variable in the first stage is the covenant heavy dummy for all regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.
